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THE DEPORTATION OF ALIENS
"Is it possible that Congress can, at its pleasure, in
disregard of the guarantees of the Constitution, expel at any
time the Irish, ... French and English who have taken up their
residence here on the invitation of the Government, while
we are at peace with the countries from which they came,
simply on the ground that they have not been naturalized?"
To 2the reader of the dai y press who has followed the
recent discussion of certain proposed amendments to our
deportation laws, the language quoted sounds familiar. But
such a reader may be surprised to learn that this language
is not taken from a radical weekly, but from the opinion ofJustice Field of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of Fong Ting Yuel decided in 1893. The familiar
sound of the sentences quoted is due largely to the comment
called forth in the papers by the recent proceedings for the
deportation of certain persons of foreign birth accused of
breeding trouble in the United States. On the one hand this
"expulsion of an undesirable foreign element" has been
hailed as a salutory rebuke to those who "abuse American
hospitality." On the other hand it has been bitterly denounced as unconstitutional and un-American, as the "Pruss anism of reactionaries bent on stifling free speech and all
liberalizing sentiment."
1149 U. S. 698.
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Whatever political effect this controversy may produce,
it has at least served to bring forward from comparative
obscurity the legal phases of the topic of deportation. Old
law has been brought forth from musty tomes; and a question arises: Is this law still sound and serviceable, or is it
an old wine skin, once used and laid away, and again brought
out to do service for the new vintage of another harvest?
So far as public or even professional interest has been
concerned, deportation has not hitherto been a live subject.
References have been made to certain deportation cases in
American law writings to prove points connected with other
topics. Deportation itself is treated in the encyclopedias
as a minor subject under the titles of Immigration and Aliens.
But it has always been regarded, apparently, as a complementary function to the exclusion process, never as a matter
of much independent importance.
But certain conditions brought about or intensified by
the war and certain recent legislation induced by those conditions, all leading up to the deportation of a considerable
number of aliens from the United States, have combined
to draw this subject out of its subordinate status in relation
to immigration and have invested it with a considerable
importance of its own in the category of current legal problems.
These problems are new in their importance in American
politics. But, as coming events are said to cast their shadows before, these problems appear to have had their prototypes in American history which have produced a considerable body of law. That law is now being invoked by those
who wrestle with the problems of today.
At the outbreak of the war, the results of our rather
ineffective control of immigration and of our very ineffective
direction of assimilation became alarmingly manifest. Large
numbers of persons in America were known to be actively
friendly to Germany. Larger numbers were suspected of
being such. The Espionage Law was passed in an effort
to meet this danger. The end of the War saw it fairly under
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control, but revealed a new problem more complicated and
difficult if not more dangerous, than the first. Lines of
influence, apparently radiating from Russia, were actuating
considerable numbers of persons in the United States to
advocate, not the success of some foreign Government in
the great struggle for existence, but the destruction of all
organized Governments based upon the social and economic
order now obtaining. It is not to be understood that this
second problem is entirely separate from the first or that
the one began and the other ended at any particular period.
They interlaced and overlapped. But speaking broadly, in
items of emphasis and of practical effect, the situation was
about as herein stated.
Certain provisions of an Act passed on February 5,
1917, were applicable to the new situation and in an effort
further to strengthen the hands of the Government, Congress, on October 16, 1918, passed an amendment to this
law designed, according to its title, "to exclude and expel
from the United States aliens who are members of anarchistic
and similar classes."
Among other things these laws provide:
"At any time within five years after entry any alien
whc at the time of entry was a member of one or more of
the classes excluded by law;

.

any alien who at

.

any time after entry shall be found advocating or teaching
the unlawful destruction of property or advocating or teaching anarchy, or the overthrow by force or violence of the
Constitution of the United States or of all forms of law, or
the assassination of public officials

.

.

.

shall upon war-

rant of the Secretary of Labor be taken into custody and
2
deported." Act of February 5, 1917.
2 The "excluded classes mentioned in the first portion of the passage
quoted are elsewhere in this act defined to be: idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded
persons, epileptics, insane persons, alcoholics, paupers, professional beggars,
vagrants, persons afflicted with tuberculosis or other dangerous, loathsome or
contagious diseases, those mentally or physically defective, those who have
committed crimes involving moral turpitude, polygamists, anarchists or persons
who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States or of all forms of law or who disbelieve in or are opposed to organized government or who advocate the assassination of public
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The same statute further provides however, "that
nothing in this Act shall exclude, if otherwise admissible,
persons convicted or who admit the commission or who
teach or advocate the commission of an offense purely
political."

The latest enactment is as follows:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
Aliens who are anarchists; aliens who believe in or advocate the
overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United
States or of all forms of law; aliens who disbelieve in or are opposed to all organized government; aliens who advocate or teach
the assassination of public officials; aliens who advocate or teach
the unlawful destruction of property; aliens who are members
of or affiliated with any organization that entertains a belief in,
teaches, or advocates the overthrow by force or violence of the
Government of the United States or of all forms of law, or that
entertains or teaches disbelief in or opposition to all organized
government, or that advocates the duty, necessity, or propriety
of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either
of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the Government
of the United States or of any other organized government, because of his or their official character, or that advocates or teaches
the unlawful destruction of property shall be excluded from admission into the United States.
"Sec. 2. That any alien who, at any time after entering
the United States, is found to have been at the time of entry,
or to have become thereafter a member of any one of the classes
of aliens enumerated in section one of this Act, shall, upon the
warrant of the Secretary of Labor, be taken into custody and
deported in the manner provided in the immigration Act of February fifth, nineteen hundred and seventeen. The provisions of
this section shall be applicable to the classes of aliens mentioned
in this Act irrespective of the time of their entry into the United
States.
"Sec. 3. That any alien who shall, after he has been excluded and deported or arrested and deported in pursuance of the
officials or who advocate or teach the unlawful destruction of property; persons

who are members of or affiliated with any organization entertaining or teaching

disbelief in or opposition to organized government or who advocate or teach the
duty, necessity or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer
or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers, generally of the Government of the United States or of any other organized Government because of
his or their official character or who advocate or teach the unlawful destruction
of property; prostitutes, those likely to become a public charge and those assisted
to come in by any person unless it is affirmatively shown they do not belong to
any of the excluded classes.
3 Act of February 5, 1917.
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provisions of this Act, thereafter return to or enter the United

States or attempt to return to or to enter the United States shall

be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall
be punished by imprisonment for a term of not more than five
years; and shall, upon the termination of such imprisonment,
be taken into custody, upon the warrant of the Secretary of Labor,
and deported in the manner provided in the immigration
Act of
February fifth, nineteen hundred and seventeen.14
In addition to the causes already noted, certain other,
particularly certain economic, factors have been active in
bringing the subject of deportation into prominence. Until
recent years, taken by and large, there has been no surplus
of population, no great surplus of labor, in the United States.
New lands, new treasuries of natural wealth, new inventions
for exploitation have enabled this country to absorb, a little
grumblingly at times, but effectually to absorb into the
productive mass of its population all the immigrants who
came. There was some opposition on the part of organized
labor. But the opposition was never very violent and was
not sufficient to overcome the traditional policy of the open
door supported by the urging of employers to increase the
supply of cheap labor. The only instance in which this
economic question stirred up .violent protest was in the case
of the Chinese and it is not surprising to see that drastic
and even arbitrary regulations were made for their exclusion.'
Recent years have marked a change, however, in this
state of affairs, and the indications point to a progressive
future development. Overcrowding of the labor market is
becoming more and more pronounced and the proportion
of the resources of the country remaining unappropriated
is yearly growing smaller. The time when America shall
cease to be a country of "unlimited" possibilities is drawing
measurably nearer. What is more natural, therefore, than
that the demand for the exclusion and deportation of foreigners should progressively increase? We may confidently
expect that efforts will be made, not only to perpetuate the
existing restrictions upon aliens being added to our numbers, but also to erect barriers at our eastern gates against
4Act

of October 16, 1918.
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the Europeans similar to those already erected at our western gates against the Asiatics.'
Certain additional legislation concerning deportation was
in contemplation at the close of the last session of Congress.
It did not pass; indeed it did not publicly take definite form,
and therefore can not be considered here, except in so far as
the discussion of it tended to indicate the drift of Congressional thought. Suffice to say that that drift was apparently in the direction of extending rather than of restricting the use of deportation as a means of dealing with the
movements of social unrest. 6
But, disregarding what was only talked of and confining
our attention to what is now in effect, deportation has taken
on a new importance in our law.
It still applies only to aliens. There is no such thing as
deportation of citizens of the United States. It is true that
while the status of citizenship is an absolute protection, so
long as it obtains, certain provisions of these laws facilitate
attacks upon the validity of accomplished naturalization
proceedings and the deportation of "denaturalized" persons
if those proceedings are annulled. For instance, the Act of
October 16, 1918, expressly removes any limitation of time
after entry within which the deportation machinery may be
set in motion, and provides, further, that any alien who,
irrespective of his status at the time of his admission, "is
.
to have become thereafter, a member of any
found .
shall be
.
one of the classes enumerated .

deported." It has been held by the courts 7 that evidence
of an immigrant's state of mind at the time of entry may be
inferred from his subsequent conduct. It has also been
frequently held that naturalization papers may be revoked
for fraud in their procurement. It follows, that a natural5 H. R. 563 introduced May i9, I919; H. R. 8572 introduced August 20,
1919. 6 H.
R. 563 and H. R. 8572 cited in note 5 provide for complete

restriction
of ordinary immigration for two years.
U. S. v. Wusterbarth, 249 Fed. 9o8; U. S. v. Damer, 249 Fed. 989. In
the Wusterbarth case the defendant had been naturalized in 1882, thirty-five
years before his "denaturalization." U. S. ex rel Canford v. Williams, 186
Fed. 354; Redfern v. Halpert, 186 Fed. i5o.
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ized alien who, after becoming a citizen, is found to fall
within any of the prohibited classes may possibly have his
naturalization declared fraudulent and void and become
thereupon subject to deportation. The question whether
he does fall within any of the prohibited classes depends
however upon the same principles that govern the deportation of aliens generally.
So, passing this somewhat incidental feature of the
matter, it is of greater interest to note the range and scope
of the law in defining the classes liable to its provisions.
It operates as we have observed, upon all who at the time
of entry were, or who subsequently thereto became, members of the prohibited classes. These comprise, in addition
to the long list of economic, physical, mental and moral
undesirables, certain people whose political opinions, utterances or affiliations are deemed detrimental to the national
welfare. The portions of the law quoted above bring at
least four classes of such persons under the ban of its condemration:
First, those who seek to accomplish certain unlawful
purposes by force;
Second, those who do not believe in the present form
of government and seek peacefully to persuade a majority
of the electors to vote for a change;
Third, those who belong to societies or organizations
whose objects are to propagate any of the beliefs or encourage
any of the acts which are grounds for deportation, although
individually, these persons may do nothing and say nothing
beyond the act of joining the society; and
Fourth, those who simply "disbelieve in" all organized
government.
Deportation procedure, furthermore, is both swift and
summary. Upon the warrant of the Secretary of Labor
the alien is "taken into custody and deported." The officer conducts a hearing and determines the facts. No
judicial hearing is necessary, or indeed often possible. The
decision of the administrative officer is final.
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The wide reach of the law, and the importance of the
interests involved-interests for which our Government has
always shown solicitude, namely the freedom of thought,
speech and action of the individual-immediately call to
mind certain constitutional questions. Have they been decided or are they yet to be decided as they arise? The
very conception of deportation, as distinguished from exclusion, raises a question when its implications are perceived.
It is one thing to forbid the entrance of persons whose presence among our people is deemed to be detrimental to our
welfare; it is another thing to allow persons to come in, to
settle among us, to make friends, to rear families, to acquire
property, to contract the manifold relationships of life, and
then summarily to send them across the seas and forbid
them ever to return. That hardship and suffering may often
result from such procedure is, of course, no sufficient legal
reason for its invalidity. But such considerations would
lend cogency to legal reasons if they were found to exist in
the Constitution.
The first deportation legislation in the United States
was passed in 1798 and has come down to us under the name
of the "Alien and Sedition" laws. These laws gave the
President power to order all such aliens as he should judge
dangerous to the peace and safety of the country or should
have reasonable ground to suspect were concerned in any
treasonable or secret machinations against the Government
to depart out of the territory of the United States within
such time as should be expressed in the order.
They created great excitement. Jefferson and Madison
attacked them bitterly. The legislature of Virginia passed
a resolution condemning them. President Adams, however,
defended them as a war measure.
By their own terms they expired in two years from the
date of passage and their constitutionality was never passed
on by the Supreme Court. But they came down in history
as odious and unpopular laws and no further similar legislation was passed until 1892.
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The Act of 1892 compelled all Chinese laborers in the
United States to secure from the Collectors of Internal
Revenue of their respective districts, before a certain date,
certificates of residence and provided that any such person
as should fail, neglect or refuse to obtain such certificate
or should thereafter be found without one should be arrested
and taken before a United States Judge, whose duty it was
to order such person's deportation, unless by affirmative
and satisfactory proof he could show his right to remain.
This Act raised the precise question here involved. It was
passed on in the case of Fong Ting Yue,8 decided May 5,
1893. The brief for the relator was written by Mr. Joseph H.
Choate. The decision was by a divided court. Mr. Justice
Brewer, dissenting from the majority, vigorously denied the
existence of the constitutional right to deport an alien who
had come lawfully into the country with the intention permanently to remain. Said he:
"That those who have become domiciled in a country, are
entitled to a more distinct and larger measure of protection than
those who are simply passing through or temporarily in it, has
long been recognized by the law of nations.

.

.

.

The writers

upon the law of nations distinguish between a temporary resident
in a foreign country for a special purpose and a residence accompanied with an intention to make it a permanent place of abode
(citing Vattel, pp. 92-93, Phillimore International Law Ch. XVIII,
P. 347). There is some force in the contention that these persons
have become 'denizens' within the true meaning of that word as
used in the common law. . .
serted is inherent in sovereignty

.
.

It is said the power here as. . the expulsion of a race

may be within the inherent powers of a despotism. Whatever
may be true as to exclusion, I deny that there is any arbitrary
and unrestrained power to banish residents, even resident aliens.
What, it may be asked, is the reason for any difference? The
answer is obvious. The Constitution has no extra-territorial
effect and those who have not come lawfully within our territory
can not claim any protection from its provisions.

.

.

.

Its

(the Act's) grievous wrong suggests this declaration of wisdom
coming from the dawn of English history: 'Verily he who dooms
a worse doom to the friendless and the comer from afar than to
his fellow, injures himself.' (Laws of King Cnut, i Thorpe Ancient Laws and Inst. of England, 397)."
8 149 U. S. 698.
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This vigorous language was approved by Chief Justice
Fuller who joined in the dissenting opinion; and Justice
Field, who had himself pronounced the judgment of the
Supreme Court in favor of the constitutionality of exclusion
laws in the pivotal case of Chae Pan Ping,9 also wrote a
dissenting opinion in which he said: ".

.

but between

legislation for the exclusion of Chinese persons,
and legislation for the deportation of those who have acquired
a residence in the country . . . there is a wide difference. .
.
The power of the Government to exclude

foreigners from the country has never been denied, but its
power to deport from the country persons lawfully domiciled
therein by its consent and engaged in the ordinary pursuits
of life has never been asserted by the legislative or executive
departments except for crime or as an act of war in view
of existing or anticipated hostilities, unless the Act of June 25,
1798,10 can be considered as recognizing that doctrine."
Notwithstanding this spirited dissent the majority of
the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Gray, sustained the law as the exercise of a power inherent in sovereignty and essential to the self-preservation of a Government. "If it could not exclude aliens it would be, to that
extent, subject to the control of a foreign power." This
decision was rendered notwithstanding the warning of Justice
Brewer: "It is true this statute is directed only against the
obnoxious Chinese, but if the power exists who shall say
it will not be exercised tomorrow against other classes and
other people"; and of a similar remark by Justice Field,
quoted at the beginning of this article, " Is it possible that
Congress can, at its pleasure, in disregard of the guarantees
of the Constitution, expel at any time the Irish, German,
French, and English who may have taken up their residence
here on the invitation of the Government, while we are at
peace with the countries from which they came, simply on
the ground that they have not been naturalized?"
9 I30 U. S. 58r.
10The Alien and Sedition Laws.
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This decision having been upheld in a line of subsequent
cases involving the rights both of Chinese and of Occidentals, the constitutional validity of deportation laws as
distinguished from exclusion laws may probably be taken
as settled.
Granting for the present that it is settled, although
certain comments on the point will be offered further along,
there are other constitutional questions involved. Freedom
of political thought and expression has long been cherished
in America. Yet we have noted at least four classes of
persons whose exclusion is predicated upon political considerations.
The first class, those who seek to instigate the overthrow of the Government or the destruction of life and
property by force, presents but little difficulty. The use of
force strikes at the root of Government by the consent of
the governed. It seeks to establish authority to rule upon
coercion and not upon popular consent and is, therefore, in
itself, the essence of despotism.
But the Act of 1918 provides for the deportation of
"anarchists." The term is not defined. It is entitled, therefore, to the broadest interpretation. Such an interpretation
fairly includes the so-called "philosophical anarchists" whose
belief is counter to the use of force for any governmental
purpose and who seek to persuade others by the use of the
ballot to bring about a reform in our Government that shall
correspond to their ideas of public policy. The existence
of this class of persons has long been recognized and at
different times the tolerant attitude of the Department of
Justice toward them has been plainly set forth by the Attorneys General." Nevertheless they are proscribed by the
"The official viewpoint of the Department of Justice is evidenced from
the following excerpt of an address on "The Suppression of Anarchy" by Hon.
James M. Beck, Attorney General of the United States, on January 21, 1902:
"On the threshold of the discussion it is necessary to define the term
'anarchy.' The word imports nothing more than disbelief in the efficacy of
any form of government. The vagaries of the human mind are like the ways of
Providence, 'mysterious and past finding out,' and there is unquestionably a
class of honest and law-abiding visionaries, who in a nebulous and semi-lucid
way, believe that the interest of society would be promoted by the abolition
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Act. These classes of persons are now being deported.12
Is their deportation on such grounds in violation of constitutional guaranty? In the case of U. S. ex rel Turner v.
Williamsi- the question was raised and passed on by the
Supreme Court. Section 2 of the Act of 1903 provided
for excluding "anarchists" and Section 38 for the exclusion
of persons "who disbelieve in or are opposed to all organized
government." The accused, an Englishman, had made
speeches advocating an anarchistic regime. He denied the
constitutionality of the law on the ground that the term
anarchist really means "philosophical anarchist" and not
one who advocates the use of force or violence. He also
set up the First Amendment to the Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press." Justice Fuller in delivering the
opinion of the Court said:
"If the word anarchist should be interpreted as including
aliens whose anarchistic views are professed as political philosof all government whatever. These doctrinaires do not believe in war, or the
taking of human life for any cause whatever. Violence has no part in their
propaganda, which is purely educational in character. This class of so-called
philosophical anarchists is small in number, and does not ordinarily fall within
the commonly accepted definition of the word, which in common speech and to
the common understanding is applied to those who seek the abolition of government by violence. To prevent, however, any criticism or question of constitutionality any legislation should preliminarily define anarchy as a movement
or conspiracy to subvert and destroy organized government by violent and
unlawful means."
An interview with Attorney General Palmer published under date of
April 4, 1919, purports to define the attitude of the Department of Justice under
the present administration. He says:
"There are two principles to be kept in mind, that we must, on the one
hand, preserve the ancient liberties guaranteed by the Constitution of freedom
of the press and freedom of speech, and that, on the other hand, we must not
permit the enlargement of those liberties.
"As long as efforts are made in the exercise of these guaranteed rights
looking to reforms, however radical, through the political method-that is,
by the education of the people along the lines proposed in the reforms-and
looking to a result from the action of the people under these methods as fixed
by our laws, no interference is necessary.
"But when the effort looks to the direct method-by force or other means
not recognized under our laws-to accomplish such alleged reforms, conduct
of that sort will be carefully scrutinized and ought to be nipped in the beginning." Washington Post, April 4, 1919. See also Von Gerichten v. Seitz, 84
N. Y. Supp. 968; Encyc. Britannica, vol. i, ixith Ed. 917.
12Case of Frank R. Lopez arrested in Boston. Opinion Judge John C.
Knox, December 9, 1918; Case of Bartolomeo Massulo, hearing December, 1917,
Seattle before Inspectors Fischer and Burford; Case of George Pawick, Seattle,
ibid.
13 194 U. S. 279.
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ophers, innocent of evil intent, it would follow that Congress was
of the opinion that the tendency of the general exploitation of
such views is so dangerous to the public weal that aliens who hold
and advocate them would be undesirable additions to our population, whether permanently or temporarily, whether many or few,
and in the light of previous discussion, the Act even in this aspect
would not be unconstitutional. . .
As to freedom of speech the Court said:
"But it is said the Act violates the First Amendment.
We are at a loss to understand in what way the Act is obnoxious
to this objection. It has no reference to an establishment of
religion nor does it prohibit the free exercise thereof; nor abridge
the freedom of speech nor of the press.
. . It is of course
true that if ari alien is not permitted to enter the country, or having
entered contrary to law, is expelled, he is in the fact cut off from
worshipping, or speaking or publishing or petitioning in the country. But that is merely because of his exclusion therefrom. He
does not become one of the people to whom these things are guaranteed by our Constitution by an attempt to enter forbidden by
law. To appeal to the Constitution is to concede that this is a
land governed by that supreme law, and as under it, power to
exclude has been determined to exist, those who are excluded
cannot assert the rights in general obtaining in a land to which
they do not belong as citizens or otherwise."
As 'the law now stands, therefore, those in class two
may be constitutionally deported.
Those in class three, i. e.; those who belong to organizations which exist for forbidden purposes should probably
be judged by the same standards as those who actually
carry out such purposes.
As to those in class four--difficulties of proof as well as
the great probability that belief will be evinced either by
speech or action make it unlikely that many cases will arise
where mere naked "disbelief in organized government" will
form the basis of deportation. Neverthelkss some such
cases have arisen. Freedom of belief is so intimately bound
up with freedom of speech that the two will probably stand
or fall together. The question has never yet been squarely
passed on by the Supreme Court, but in view of its past
holdings it is fairly safe to prophesy what the Court's holding
would be. There are, however, certain points of difference
which will also be commented upon hereafter.

11o
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But turning from the substantive to the adjective side
of the law, is the precedure prescribed free from constitutional infirmity?
Judged solely by its effect upon the alien it would seem
indisputabile that deportation is a deprival of liberty and,
perhaps, of property. The person is taken into custody,
deprived of his freedom to go and come. He may be suddenly taken away from business, from the management of
his property and compelled to leave it behind. The result
of such compulsion is very likely to be great financial loss.
He may be severed from the ties of home, of relatives, of
friends. Again, judged by its effects, he is subjected to
punishment.
Is it permissible under the Constitution to subject a
person within the jurisdiction of the United States to these
things by the mere order of an executive officer?
Referring again to the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brewer in the Fong Ting Yue where a Chinese laborer had
failed to secure a certificate of residence, it is stated:
"Section 6 (Act of 1892) deprives of 'life, liberty and property' without due process of law. It imposes punishment without
a trial and punishment cruel and severe.

.

.

. Deportation

is a punishment. It involves first, an arrest, a deprival of liberty,
and second a removal from home, from family, from business,
from property . . . it needs no citation to support the proposition that deportation is punishment . . . and that oftentimes most severe and cruel. . . . But punishment implies a
trial. . . . Due process requires that a man be heard before

he is condemned and both heard and condemned in the due and
orderly procedure of a trial as recognized by the common law from
time immemorial."
This view of the matter did not prevail, however, the
majority of the court, speaking through Justice Gray, saying:
"The proceeding
for a crime or offense.

.

.
.

. is in no sense a trial and sentence
. . The order of deportation is not

a banishment in the sense in which that word is often applied to
the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment.

.

. He has not therefore been deprived of life, liberty

or property without due process of law and the provisions of
the Constitution securing the right of trial by jury and prohibiting
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unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel and unusual punishments have no application."
It has uniformly been held that deportation proceedings
are not criminal proceedings. The order of expulsion is not
4
a sentence of punishment.1
But although the guaranty of a judicial trial provided
in the Sixth Amendment for those accused of crime is not
applicable, the fact remains that deportation does deprive
of liberty and property. Does the procedure provided comply with the necessity for due process of law? Such compliance is admitted to be necessary. So long as the procedure followed is in good faith, and does not amount to an
abuse of process and provides the means for an inquiry into
the merits of the case the courts have held the requirement
of due process to be satisfied. Due process does not necessarily imply judicial process.' 5
Some courts, indeed, have gone to great lengths in upholding the validity of proceedings in deportation. In Kaorn
Yamataya v. Fischer6 it was held that the proceeding was
not wanting in due process where the alien had a noticealthough not a formal notice-of the institution of proceedings against her and although (she claimed) she could
not understand the language or the meaning of the notice.
Lack of power to compel the attendance of witnesses is
7
not lack of due process.'
In Ekiu v. U. S.18 it was held that in reaching a decision
whether an alien is lawfully entitled to enter the country,
it is not necessary for the administrative officer to take
testimony.
If the alien is given a hearing in good faith, although
not present in person, or by counsel, nor informed of the
14 Fong Ting Yue, i49 U. S. 698; Zakonarte v. Wolfe, 226 U. S. 272;
Choy Yun v. Bockus, 223 Fed. 487. Where a law provides for punishment
at hard labor in addition to deportation it is not constitutional.
15Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., I8 How. 272; Springer v. U. S.,
102 U. S. 586; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497; Reetz v. Mich.,
i88 U. S. 505.

16189 U. S. 86.
17
'8

Low, Wah Suey,
i42

U. S. 65i.

225

U. S.460.
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nature of the testimony, the requirements of due process are
observed.39
These latter holdings have been modified however by
the later case of Ex parte Petkos.20 In that case it was held
that a fair hearing before an immigration officer means a
hearing in accordance with the fundamental principle that
there be due process of' law and implies that the alien shall
not only have the opportunity to present evidence in his
favor but that he shall be apprised of the evidence against
him. It is not enough that the officer meant to be fair.
The extent to which the doctrine, that final decision of
questions involving liberty or property may be vested in
administrative officer, has been carried, is indicated by the
Ju Toy case. 2 '

This case was preceded by the case of U. S.

vs. Sing Tuck22 in which the contention was made that the
question whether the person seeking admission was an alien,
went to the foundation of the immigration officer's jurisdiction to act at all, and that this jurisdictional question was
triable only in the courts. The Supreme Court avoided
passing on this question in this case by holding that the
petitioner had not carried his appeal to the highest administrative officer authorized to hear it and therefore had no
right to invoke the aid of the court. But in the Ju Toy
case the appeal was duly prosecuted to the limit of administrative authority and then taken into court. The Supreme
Court thereupon held that even the fundamental question
of whether the petitioner was an alien could be finally determined by the immigration officer and the case was accordingly dismissed.
It may be noted in passing that if the question of alienage is a question of law and not a question of fact, the courts
will take jurisdiction. In Gonzales v. Williams23 the question was raised, whether a native of Porto Rico who was
an inhabitant of the island at the time of its cession to the
"In re Can Pon, 168 Fed. 479.
20212 Fed. 275.
21 i98 U. S. 253.
2
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U. S. 16I.

3192 U. S. 1.
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United States was upon her arrival at a port of this country
to be treated as an alien immigrant. The point in issue
was one of law and the Court took jurisdiction of the case
and decided it.
In general, however, where jurisdiction to determine an
alien's rights is vested by Congress in administrative officers,
the courts will not interfere except to inquire whether the
essential procedural requirements of due process have been
followed. Something more than good faith is required however. Thus in Ex parte Petkos the immigration officer had
ordered the exclusion of an alien upon a finding made erroneously although apparently in good faith, that psoriasis,
with which the alien was afflicted, was a noisome, ill-smelling
disease that would disable the alien to make a living. The
Court held that it was not sufficient that the erroneous finding was made in good faith. If the controlling fact was of
such nature that its determination was not a matter of
judgment but a matter capable of scientific demonstration,
an erroneous determination was an abuse of process sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the judicial tribunal. The court
held this to be such a case.
Present indications point to a good deal of litigation
over the exclusion and deportation of aliens in the near
future. New and more drastic legislation is likely to give
rise to further testings of constitutional authority.
The law, as it has been developed by the cases that have
already arisen, places in the hands of the federal government almost unlimited authority, actual or potential. Under
the rulings of the Supreme Court, the right to exclude aliens
is inherent in territorial sovereignty. The power to provide
such exclusion is vested in Congress. The limits within
which the power may be exercised are bounded only by the
discretion of Congress and the guaranty of due process of
law. This power may be vested by Congress in administrative officers and the courts will only interfere to prevent
an abuse of discretion in carrying out the due process of
the law. This power of exclusion applies as well to aliens
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who have taken up residence here with intent permanently
to remain as to those just arriving or to transients. The
power to exclude does not depend upon the commission of
any offense and it is not a punishment for crime although
the commission of certain acts or the uttering of certain
words may be made the ground for deportation. Aliens
cannot therefore invoke the constitutional guaranty of a
judicial or jury trial. Aliens are here by sufference and
not by right and can not claim, as protection against deportation, the constitutional provisions of free speech, free
press, freedom of worship or of the right to assemble or to
petition for redress of grievances.
It will thus appear that most of the major propositions
have apparently been settled in the cases developed by the
prototypes of our present problems.
These propositions have been settled at a time when
public sentiment was comparatively little aroused or, if
aroused at all, was practically unanimous against the contentions of the relators. Most of the principles have been
established in cases where Chinese were concerned and,
although lawyers like Mr. Choate and Judges such as Justices Brewer, Field and Fuller uttered their protests against
the establishment of certain doctrines, the sovereign and
impeccable power of Congress to deal with aliens at its own
discretion has been repeatedly affirmed.
It would not be true to state that these cases were
decided without due and mature consideration. Still they
were decided under circumstances considerably different, in
times considerably less troubled than the present. In a
very real sense, therefore, old law is being applied to new
problems.
However, if a plebiscite were taken upon the subject
it is likely that a considerable majority of the American
people would today regard the principles thus established
as sound and proper. The sense of public danger, aroused
by the war, is still upon us and the elemental instinct of
self-defense calls forth a demand for strong and effective
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regulation of those who seek to remove the ancient landmarks.
Without seeking to decry this feeling which is proper
and indeed necessary to national solidarity, it may still be
well to pause to consider one or two of the principles here
involved.
Schooled from infancy to the belief that this nation
was "conceived in liberty" Americans must never relax that
eternal vigilance which is its price.
If we concede the constitutional power of Congress to
deport a person whose offense consists in persuading our
citizens to change, by the peaceful means of the ballot,
the form of our Government, or consists simply in disbelief
in Government, is the exercise of such power consonant with
American principles?
The statement of the Attorney General quoted in the
note, supra, indicates that for the present at least the policy
of the Government is not to invoke this power.
"As long as efforts are made in the exercise of these guaranteed (constitutional) rights, looking to reforms, however radical,
through the political method-that is by the education of the
people along the lines proposed in the reforms-and looking to
a result from the action of the people under these methods as
fixed by our laws, no interference is necessary.
"But when the effort looks to the direct method-by force
or other means not recognized under our law-to accomplish such
alleged reforms, conduct of that sort will be carefully scrutinized
and ought to be nipped in the beginning."
But the law still stands. If it is constitutional it may
at any time be used-indeed has been used. But is it constitutional?
Let us again consider whether the Court is on tenable
ground in its holding that deportation and exclusion are
governed by the same principles. Such reconsideration may
appear less presumptious when it is recalled that Justices
Brewer and Field, in carefully reasoned opinions dissented
from the majority holding and that Chief Justice Fuller
joined in their dissent.
The decision of the majority, that permissive entry,
followed by lawful residence, accompanied by an intention
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permanently to remain in the country confer no constitutional protection upon the alien, is placed upon the ground
that the right to deport is inherent in sovereignty, and that
the lack of such right would subject the government to the
dominion of foreign powers.
Taking up the latter phase of this proposition first: It
is said that to deny Congress this power would place the
United States pro tanto under foreign dominion. This, it
is submitted, is a non sequitur. If an alien commits or
attempts to commit by word or act any offense against our
laws or is guilty of treasonable conduct or of conspiracy, he
is amenable to the same control and the same punishment
as that provided for citizens. The criminal laws of the
It is
United States apply as well to aliens as to citizens.2
uniformly held that while aliens are within our territory
they are subject to our laws. And on the other hand it is
difficult to see how conduct on the part of an alien which
would not be punishable if indulged in by a citizen can
necessarily endanger the sovereignty or independence of the
land.
Turning now to the first phase of the proposition, that
the right is inherent in sovereignty:
It may be granted that the right to deal with aliens is
inherent in sovereignty so far as international law is concerned. The citations from writers on the law of nations
are sound for the purpose for which they were written, i. e.,
as tenets of international law. But the exercise of many
rights inherent in sovereignty is limited by our Constitution. Unfettered by such limitation, sovereign power may
regulate religion, speech and the press; may impair the
obligation of contracts and do any of the things provided
against in the Constitution. To say therefore that the
exercise of a power is valid because the power is inherent
in sovereignty is to ignore the purposes for which the constitutional limitations were framed.
Yet this doctrine, of a power inherent in sovereignty
by the exercise of which the deportation of aliens is com24Corpus Juris-Artcle on Aliens.

Wharton, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 819.
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pletely removed from the operation of certain guarantees in
the Constitution, underlies the entire structure of the cases
heretofore cited.
The Constitution provides that Congress shall make no
law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.
Justice Fuller says that a law directing the deportation
of an alien because of what he has spoken or published is
not a law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press
because the alien, being subject to exclusion or deportation
as such, can not claim the protection of this provision.
Now it may be true that the alien, by his status, is
estopped to contest the validity of the law. But the prohibition is upon Congress. "Congress shall make no law,
etc." If an alien is disabled to contest the constitutionality
of such a law, may not a citizen whose interests are adversely
affected by its operation make such a contest? Does a
law, which does what the Constitution says a law may not
do, cease to contravene the Constitution because the alien
has no standing in court? Can the constitutional limitation
of governmental policy regarding free speech be ignored in
passing laws because the person against whom the laws operated can not be heard to protest? This result can onlyfollow if the "inherent in sovereignty" doctrine is sound.
It is submitted that the validity of the court's holding on
this point is at least questionable.
Again consider the cases of those who are to be excluded
simply because they "disbelieve in all organized government." They may simply believe that a state of society
where there is no government is preferable to one where any
form of organized government exists. If Congress has power
to pass a law excluding persons for such a state of mind
alone, may it not also by similar law exclude those who believe or disbelieve any proposition of fact? May it not
exclude them for belief or disbelief in the existence of God?
And may it not declare that all aliens now in America who
either believe in or disbelieve in God shall be deported?
According to the reasoning of the majority opinions in the
cases cited this conclusion would seem inevitable. Yet would
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not such a law so closely approximate a law prohibiting the
free exercise of religion that distinction would be impossible?
Again it is submitted that there is food for thought.
The -combination of forces generated by motives of
political expediency with forces resulting from increasing
economic pressure will tend to strain every stay upon the
deportation powers of Congress. The law as now expounded
has already cleared the way; has in fact cut into certain
fundamental American tenets. But, "life is more than meat
and the body is more than raiment." There are things even
more important than economic prosperity. These are the
basic liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. Once more,
in the cycle of time, we are passing through conditions,
remembered by the framers of our Government, in which
the temptation is strong to encroach on principle to achieve
particular ends; to save us in these crises the constitutional
guaranties were framed. In just such times as these they
are needed.
Now it is true that the cases already decided seem in
point; they construe statute law in some cases practically
identical with that now in force. Nevertheless, they rest,
as has been suggested, on reasoning fundamentally questionable. And they were decided, moreover, in an atmosphere
of popular sentiment and for the accomplishment of a popular
purpose quite different from the conditions of the present.
The great, underlying ratio decidendi of the Chinese cases
was economic and social. The Chinese were undesirable
because they worked for wages and lived in conditions unbecoming to American workmen. Political considerations,
the right to free speech and free belief were not much concerned. The present effort is of a different nature. It is
true that economic considerations are intermingled and
complicate the problem, but the emphasis of the law, particularly of the portions here dealt with, is upon political
considerations. The economic forces are temporarily behind
the scenes. Their strength is merged in the effort to deport
aliens for political reasons.
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Here lies danger. It is not contended that the efforts
of the Government to restrain unlawful attacks upon its
existence should be weakened. On the contrary its vigilance
should be redoubled and its strength renewed. But the
preservation of "free" government can not be permanently
accomplished by the abridgment of the fundamentals of
freedom. Is it hardly thinkable that the Supreme Court
in laying down the rules above noted had in contemplation
any such object? It had in view an entirely different purpose, the serving of an economic end. In spite of the warnings of Justice Brewer, the majorities apparently did not
contemplate the rise of present circumstances. It is submitted that these decisions go a little too far. Not only
do they rest upon questionable logic, but they are now being
applied to a purpose radically different from that for which
they were made.
Close examination of our deportation laws will be called
forth by coming events. This is fortunate. Every proper
means should be used to prevent persons evilly disposed
from doing violence to the ark of our covenant, the perpetuation of our democratic Government. But in our zeal
to protect that ark from the spoliation of the stranger we
must not ourselves stretch forth an impious hand to touch,
the sacred shrine. Freedom is our greatest possession; our
free institutions, our greatest heritage. Neither the encystation of old law settled in a time of popular lethargy
nor the engrafting of new law in a time of heat and passion
should be allowed to mar the growth of our free institutions
in this land of liberty.
Howard L. Bevis.
Cincinnati,Ohio.

